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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Kenneth M. Murchison*
The October 1987 term of the United States Supreme Court produced
no dramatic surprises in local government law. As usual, the Court
handed down important decisions in cases involving local governments,
but this year's decisions tended to amplify prior doctrine rather than
to break new ground. For example, opinions involving first amendment
claims emphasized the need for standards limiting the power of local
governments to restrict freedom of expression' and upheld an ordinance
that limited picketing in residential areas. 2 In addition, the Court nar-
rowly defined the class of local governmental officials and employees
whose activities may give rise to governmental liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 3
As usual, the bulk of the local government law cases decided by
the Louisiana courts during the past year involved public employees and
the tort liability of local governments. Significant decisions clarified the
procedural protections mandated by the Constitution before public ser-
vants can be discharged4 and the scope of the restrictions imposed on
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* J. Denson Smith Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University.
1. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988) (or-
dinance that gives mayor unfettered discretion to deny newsrack permit application or to
condition permit on any terms mayor deems "necessary and reasonable" violates first
amendment).
2. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988) (ordinance that bans picketing which
is focused on and taking place in front of a particular residence is not facially invalid
under the first amendment).
3. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915 (1988) (findings that decisions
of supervisors were not individually reviewed for propriety by higher supervisory officials
and that the civil service commission decided appeals in a circumscribed manner which
gave substantial deference to original decision maker were insufficient to support conclusion
that supervisors were authorized to establish city employment policy with respect to transfers
and layoffs). For an analysis of the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980), which refused to extend the good-
faith immunity defense to governmental defendants in litigation under section 1983, see
Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Local Government Law, 41 La. L.
Rev. 483, 509-18 (1981) [hereinafter Murchison, 1979-1980 Developments].
4. See Brumfield v. Department of Fire, 523 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988)
(Louisiana Constitution requires that fire fighter be given written notice of proposed
discharge prior to predischarge hearing required by Loudermill); see also Maurello v.
Department of Health and Human Resources, 510 So. 2d 458 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
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public servants by state ethics laws.' But most of the cases involving
public employees concerned the protections available to civil service
employees. In those decisions, the courts did far more than simply
review the merits of individual disciplinary actions.6 They approved a
municipal requirement that city employees reside in the city7 and resolved
denied, 514 So. 2d 460 (1987) (due process required that state employee be given notice
of her right to respond to the charge that she abandoned her position prior to termination).
During 1987-88, the federal courts of appeal also rendered several important opinions
regarding the constitutional rights of public employees. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988) (public employee's personal stake in employment dispute
that involves a matter of public concern does not remove employee's comments about
dispute from first amendment protection); White v. Elrod, 816 F.2d 1172 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 286 (1987) (county could constitutionally discharge only ringleaders
of guards who participated in illegal strike).
5. See In re Schneckenburger, 518 So. 2d 497 (La. 1988) (where permits from the
office of the municipal director of inspection and code enforcement were required to
build a house on the lot, the director violated prohibition against public servant receiving
thing of economic value in consideration of services rendered when he bought a lot,
obtained a variance from the Board of Appeals, and sold lot to contractors and developers);
Gravois v. State, 517 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 520 So. 2d 119
(1988) (ethics code forbids school board from accepting bid from spouse of superintendent's
executive secretary even though he was the lowest bidder in sealed bid competition); In
re Sea Shell, Inc., 509 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987) (corporation wholly owned
by siblings of parish president violated code by entering into contract to supply shell to
parish).
6. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Department of Police, 522 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1988) (civil service commission decision upholding appeals of two police officers was
justified by city attorney's failure to prosecute cases diligently); Ellins v. Department of
Health, 519 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (technician's conduct, in bypassing triage
desk and taking patient who had reportedly suffered several seizures in short period of
time directly to accident room in accordance with physician's instructions did not impair
efficiency of service sufficiently to justify technician's dismissal); Boyce v. Department of
Streets, 518 So. 2d 20 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So. 2d 144 (1988)
(employees who followed thirty-three-year-old department policy when they left work early
when no more work presented itself and remained "on call" at home while charging city
for eight-hour day were not subject to dismissal or discipline); Carr v. Sewerage and
Water Bd., 517 So. 2d 1197 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (hearing officer properly excluded
proffered testimony concerning altercation between civil service employee and foreman
where supervisor testified that incidents away from immediate job site had no bearing on
his action in dismissing employee); Leslie v. New Orleans Police Dept., 508 So. 2d 157
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (police officer's failure to deliver original arrest warrant, evidence,
and bulletin on wanted subject or to complete and to forward supplemental report during
the course of the investigation provided legal cause for ten-day suspension). For a decision
reviewing a dismissal under the Teacher Tenure law, see Marcotte v. Avoyelles Parish
School Bd., 512 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 513 So. 2d 823 (1987)
(evidence of principal's mismanagement of school funds was sufficient to justify his
dismissal).
7. Hensley v. City Planning Comm'n, 517 So. 2d 1205 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
1988] LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
issues concerning promotions,8 layoffs, 9 and compensation. 0 The tort
decisions also covered a wide variety of topics: identification of the
responsible office or governmental entity;" the standards of care ap-
plicable in suits involving sheriffs, 2 schools and school boards, 3 parishes, 4
8. See Snell v. City of Shreveport, 514 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987) (reem-
ployment of retired police officer in "over-strength" position caused no harm to fellow
police officer where it did not prejudice his promotion rights).
9. See Rudloff v. Department of Civil Serv., 514 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1987) (letter challenging validity of 1983 service rating and layoff based on average of
that rating with those for two other years was appeal of layoff rather than of nonappealable
rating itself).
10. See City of Lafayette v. Comp Time for Certain Firemen, 525 So. 2d 181 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1988) (civil service board could not reverse fire chief's decision regarding
payment for compensatory time unless the chief acted in bad faith or without cause or
was arbitrary and capricious); New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n of La. Local 632 v. City
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 521 So. 2d 452 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (amount of regularly
occurring work time for which firemen were entitled to sick leave pay was 56-hour week,
which they regularly worked, rather than 48-hour week); Beverly v. Sewerage and Water
Bd., 519 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (despite reinstatement by civil service
commission, employees were not entitled to back pay when they were partly at fault for
their dismissal).
11. See Paridon v. Parish of Rapides, 524 So. 2d 780 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (parish
was not liable for accident that occurred on road that was owned and maintained by the
state); Griffin v. Foti, 523 So. 2d 935 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (sheriff, not city, was
liable for injuries suffered by inmate in parish jail, whether claim was based on negligence
or strict liability); Duhon v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 517 So. 2d 1016 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1987) (sheriff was liable under doctrine of respondeat superior for action of
inmate who was driving tractor from which injured inmate fell); St. Amant v. Callais &
Sons, Inc., 508 So. 2d 887 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987) (parish was not liable for alleged
inadequate and unsafe traffic controls at highway intersection owned and maintained by
state).
12. See Calloway v. City of New Orleans, 524 So. 2d 182 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988)
(sheriff was negligent in failing to transport pregnant prisoner to hospital when she first
complained of abdominal pains where sheriff's employees knew prisoner was pregnant
and that she was complaining of abdominal pains).
13. See Laneheart v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 524 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1988) (school must provide supervision for children who are waiting on school grounds
for school bus or participating in before or after hours activities sanctioned by school);
Springer v. St. Bernard Parish School Bd., 521 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988)
(school board was not liable for injuries sustained by volunteer assistant coach who jumped
over chain link playground fence to retrieve softball and slipped on wet grass); St. Pierre
v. Lombard, 512 So. 2d 1206 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987) (school board that rented stadium
to secondary school for athletic event but assumed no duty under the contract to provide
security for the event was not liable to parents of boy who was fatally stabbed while
attending the event).
14. See, e.g., Tracy v. Parish of Jefferson, 523 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988)
(parish liable under negligence and strict liability theories for its failure to maintain water
meter in such a way that accumulation of grass between meter and lid would not cause
the lid to give way when a person stepped on it); Garrett v. City of Baton Rouge, 521
So. 2d 638 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 523 So. 2d 235 (1988) (notice of spill on
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municipalities, 5 and other local governmental entities; 6 the scope of the
statutory immunity afforded to those who own land devoted to recre-
ational uses; 7 and the personal liability of individual public servants.' 8
road could not be imputed to city-parish simply because there may have been city-parish
trucks in the area on the day of the accident); Douget v. Allen Parish Police Jury, 520
So. 2d 813 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) (police jury has legal duty to erect warning signs
sufficient to warn motorists of hazardous conditions); Webster v. Terrebonne Parish
Council, 515 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 516 So. 2d 368 (1988)
(even assuming that floor of courthouse was wet at time of accident, parish that employed
morning and evening maintenance crew and that saw to it that floor was swept at least
once daily adequately fulfilled its duty to keep floors reasonably safe); Michel v. Ascension
Parish Police Jury, 524 So. 2d 1369 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 530 So. 2d 567
(1988) (police jury was liable for failing to erect railings on bridge crossing canal); Kogos
v. Payton, 522 So. 2d 1198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (city was not vicariously liable for
actions of officer who injured person during an altercation that arose out of barroom
argument because officer was not acting within the course and scope of his employment).
15. Riche v. City of Baton Rouge, 515 So. 2d 765 (La. 1987) (easily removable
barricades that city had placed around catch basin, which had been washed from original
position, and which had floated around street for two to four months posed an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to cyclist lawfully driving on the street); Cashio v. State, 518 So.
2d 1063 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987) (village was not liable under maintenance contract for
damages arising out of accident that resulted from design and construction of highway
rather than its maintenance); Brown v. Department of Transp. and Dev., 513 So. 2d 379
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1987), writ denied, 515 So. 2d 446 (1987) (absent knowledge of
dangerous condition, city was not liable for drainage line that state had the obligation
to maintain); Cormier v. City of Breaux Bridge, 524 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988)
(one-inch protrusion in street did not present unreasonable risk of harm); Scales v. St.
John, 522 So. 2d 1192 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 523 So. 2d 1331 (1988) (city
was liable under article 2317 where evidence supported the trial court's finding that
obstructed traffic signal at the intersection was a substantial factor in causing the accident);
Moon v. City of Baton Rouge, 522 So. 2d 117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987) (city-parish was
strictly liable for its failure to maintain safe highway shoulder at site of accident); Garrett
v. City of Baton Rouge, 521 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988) (oil-based tar spill on
road did not present an unreasonable risk of harm).
16. Batiste v. City of New Orleans, 518 So. 2d 1180 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
521 So. 2d 1188 (1988) (sewerage and water board was strictly liable for damages resulting
from subsidence caused by leakage problems at sewer collection point); Ivey v. Housing
Authority, 514 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987) (parking barrier consisting of pipe
raised approximately one and one-half feet above ground and running parallel to sidewalk
was not defective because it did not present an unreasonable risk of harm).
17. Adams v. State, 525 So. 2d 55 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (recreational use immunity
statute applied to situation where plaintiff was injured while diving off homemade diving
platform at rural recreational area). For discussions of the Louisiana statute and recent
decisions construing it, see Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1986-1987-Local Gov-
ernment Law, 48 La. L. Rev. 303, 327-29 (1987) [hereinafter Murchison, 1986-1987
Developments]; Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1985-1986-Local Government Law,
47 La. L. Rev. 305, 323-32 (1986) [hereinafter Murchison, 1985-1986 Developments].
18. Touchton v. Kroger Co., 512 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) (officers were
not responsible for issuance of worthless check warrant, arrestee failed to state a cause
of action against the officers for malicious prosecution); Hamrick v. Lee, 511 So. 2d 818
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Another large number of local government law decisions concerned
election problems, a reminder that 1987 was an election year in Louis-
iana. In addition to resolving the normal attacks on local option elec-
tions,' 9 the courts also heard a number of other election challenges. In
these decisions the courts reemphasized the necessity of proving irreg-
ularities sufficient to change the outcome of the election, 20 concluded
that the seven-day period for challenging an election is a peremptive
one that cannot be extended, 2' and held that votes cast for a candidate
who dies before election day should not to be counted in determining
whether the front runner received a majority of the total votes cast. 22
The 1987-88 decisions also addressed a variety of pre-election contro-
versies. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the election statutes
which require candidates to be electors of the parishes in which they
seek election are inapplicable to candidates for the post of coroner.
23
It also applied to an action to enjoin the holding of a recall election
the requirement that one who challenges an election show irregularities
sufficient to change the outcome. 24 The courts of appeal allowed a
candidate to use a nickname on his notice of candidacy form; 25 concluded
that a candidate remains a domiciliary of the parish in which he has
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1987) (failure of court clerk to bring outstanding attachment to
attention of judge when case was dismissed did not render her liable to arrestee where
clerk never assumed any duty to particular plaintiff in regard to attachment and no statute
or court rule imposed such a duty on the clerk).
19. See Helling v. Webster Parish Police Jury, 523 So. 2d 904 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 525 So. 2d 534 (1988) (1972 local option statute governed powers of parish
police jury when 1974 amendments were ruled unconstitutional); Acy v. Allen Parish
Police Jury, 520 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) (adoption of new ordinance allowed
denial of beer permit even though applicant had previously been awarded writ of mandamus
to compel issuance of permit under prior ordinance).
20. See Davis v. McGlothin, 524 So. 2d 1320 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 525
So. 2d 1046 (1988) (election contestant failed to state cause of action where number of
viable voting challenges was insufficient to vary outcome of election); Burford v. Sanders,
520 So. 2d 993 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987) (order of new election was proper where evidence
was sufficient to support finding of irregularities sufficient to change the result).
21. Small v. Desselle, 520 So. 2d 1167 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) (suit filed after seven-
day period for election contest fails to state a cause of action).
22. Broussard v. Miller, 514 So. 2d 765 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 516 So.
2d 122 (1987).
23. Gonzales v. Fraiche, 510 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1987). Prior to Gonzales, the third
circuit had held in Miller v. Poimboeuf, 514 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987), that
a candidate for the office of coroner must be a resident of the parish in which he seeks
office but need not be domiciled in such parish. In Miller, the court's decision apparently
was not appealed because the candidate was a resident of the parish in which he sought
election.
24. Bougere v. Edwards, 517 So. 2d 141 (La. 1987) (reversing 517 So. 2d 351 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1987)).
25. Wilson v. Butler, 513 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
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filed his candidacy even though he and his family later reside temporarily
in another parish after the family residence is destroyed; 26 and construed
the statute that calls for an annual canvass and purge of the voting
rolls "in January" to require merely that the canvass and purge be
initiated in that month. 27
Louisiana's appellate courts also produced opinions worthy of note
in other areas. These opinions addressed a wide variety of issues including
state control over local governments, 28 conflicts between local governing
authorities and elected and appointed officials, 29 land use regulation,30
26. Chandler v. Brock, 510 So. 2d 778 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
27. Louisiana Voter Registration/Educ. Crusade, Inc. v. Office of the Registrar of
Voters for the Parish of Orleans, 511 So. 2d 1190 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 512
So. 2d 854 (1987).
28. Bellard v. City of Eunice, 524 So. 2d 797 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (notwithstanding
contrary city ordinance, state statute entitles city employee to full pay during period in
which employee is performing reserve duties while on military leave); Bruno v. City of
New Orleans, 523 So. 2d 1384 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (state statute requires that civil
service commission include officers' state supplemental pay in calculating overtime).
29. See Konrad v. Jefferson Parish Council, 520 So. 2d 393 (La. 1988); infra notes
34-78 and accompanying text. See also Registrar of Voters v. Morehouse Parish Police
Jury, 521 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ granted, 524 So. 2d 514 (1988) (contribution
by police jury on behalf of parish registrar of voters to parish insurance program was a
salary supplement that could not be reduced during registrar's incumbency in position);
Bourgere v. Anzelmo, 517 So. 2d 1121 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So.
2d 130 (1988) (ordinance giving aldermen final veto of, or assent to, hiring or firing of
each noncivil service municipal employee conflicted with statute giving mayor day-to-day
responsibility for administering municipal government, but ordinance requiring mayor to
certify to aldermen that person who was proposed for hire met all of qualifications for
position did not conflict with mayor's statutory powers).
30. See Lozes v. Waterson, 513 So. 2d 1155 (La. 1987); Jones v. Cusimano, 524
So. 2d 172 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 525 So. 2d 1057 (1988); infra notes 79-108
and accompanying text. See also Tolis v. Cooper, 522 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1988) (despite conflict between restrictive covenant and land use ordinance, landowner
was not entitled to variance where there was nothing peculiar about land for which
variance was sought and landowner had actual knowledge of zoning requirement prior to
pouring of slab so that there was no demonstrable hardship); Schoop v. New Orleans
Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 519 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (city's failure
to deny liquor permit within statutory period did not entitle owner to permit); Busalacchi
v. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 519 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (board had
no authority to grant variance from height limitations pertaining to garage); Annison v.
Hoover, 517 So. 2d 420 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied,, 519 So. 2d 148 (1988)
(municipality may impose restrictions on property that are more restrictive than those
placed by preexisting covenants, and such stricter restrictions constitute a taking only if
they destroy a major part of the property's value); Fleckinger v. Jefferson Parish Council,
510 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987) (given unique nature of area devoted exclusively
to large lots and large homes, parish council did not abuse its discretion in including
* that resubdivision would violate neighborhood norm and would violate best interests of
general welfare); Zoning Bd. of Hammond v. Tangipahoa Ass'n for Retarded Citizens,
510 So. 2d 751 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 515 So. 2d 445 (1987) (city was entitled
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constitutional limits on the taxing power of local governments,3' public
contracts,3 2 and the interpretation of the Open Meeting and Public
Record laws."
The most significant of the state decisions fall within three categories:
conflicts between local governments and independent elected officials,
land use regulation, and the taxing authority of local governments. The
remainder of this article examines these decisions in detail.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND ELECTED PUBLIC
OFFICERS
In Louisiana many of the public officers who are elected from local
(usually parochial) districts remain independent of local governing au-
to injunction against operation of community home for mentally handicapped adults in
area zoned for single family dwellings). For a discussion of earlier cases involving res-
trictions of group homes in residential areas, see Murchison, 1985-1986 Developments,
supra note 17 at 316-23.
31. See City of New Orleans v. Scramuzza, 507 So. 2d 215 (La. 1987); infra notes
108-34 and accompanying text. See also City of New Orleans v. Baumer Foods, Inc.,
521 So. 2d 428 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted, 523 So. 2d 219 (1988) (equipment that
was assembled into immovable assembly line upon its arrival at manufacturing plant
became immovable by destination and was not, therefore, subject to the city's use tax);
Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Police Jury, 517 So. 2d 192 (La. App. ist Cir. 1987),
writ denied, 520 So. 2d 424 (1988) (creation of sales tax district excluding municipal
residents of parish did not violate due process rights of municipal residents nor deny
them equal protection); cf. State Bond Comm'n v. All Taxpayers, 510 So. 2d 662 (La.
1987) (statute authorizing state to issue revenue anticipation notes is constitutional).
32. See Bristol Steel and Iron Works, Inc. v. State, 507 So. 2d 1233 (La. 1987)
(statute granting Louisiana residents a five percent preference in letting contracts for public
works is constitutional because it is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of
encouraging Louisiana industries); Donald M. Clement Contractor, Inc. v. St. Charles
Parish, 524 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988) (unsuccessful lowest bidder had no right
to notice or hearing on rejection of sewerage system bid due to failure to provide A
rated bid bond); King Cold Storage Warehouse, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 522 So.
2d 169 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (public body with authority to make the determination
of who is lowest responsible bidder is given wide discretion, and its judgment will not
be overturned unless arbitrary or capricious).
33. Wagner v. Beauregard Parish Police Jury, 525 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1988) (police jury could void appointment made in violation of agenda rule of Open
Meetings Law); Jackson v. Board of Comm'rs, 514 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 515 So. 2d 1111 (1987) (contract adopted at meeting where matter was not on
agenda and no vote was taken was void because the action violated the Open Meetings
Law); State v. Burnes, 516 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (report prepared by
homicide detectives called to scene of crime by officers who investigated complaint was
not the initial report of the officers investigating the complaint and thus was not a public
record to which defendant was entitled to access).
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thorities.34 In a series of decisions rendered over the past several years,
the state's appellate courts have defined the relationship between those
officers and the local governments in the areas they served. Most of
the cases have involved tort liability,35 but fiscal conflicts have also
surfaced on several occasions.3 6
During 1988, the Louisiana Supreme Court had to resolve two new
fiscal controversies. Although the court decided one of the cases in
favor of the public official and the other in favor of the local govern-
ment, the court employed the same general approach in both cases by
referring the matter to the legislature for final resolution.
The first of the 1988 decisions, Konrad v. Jefferson Parish Council,37
involved a constitutional challenge to certain action undertaken by a
local government. In Konrad the judges of the Jefferson Parish Juvenile
Court complained that the establishment of a Department of Juvenile
Services by the Parish of Jefferson interfered with the inherent consti-
tutional powers of their court. The supreme court rejected that claim
and remanded the case for trial on other issues.
Understanding the dispute between the parish and the judges requires
a brief review of the constitutional and statutory provisions regarding
juvenile courts and the juvenile courts in Jefferson Parish in particular.
Article V of the 1974 constitution establishes the state judicial system.
Section 18 provides that juvenile court shall have the jurisdiction provided
by law. 38 Additionally, Article VI, Section 25 forbids local governments
34. See, e.g., La. Const. art. VI, §§ 5(G) (home rule charter of a local government
cannot affect the offices of district attorney, sheriff, assessor, clerk of district court, or
coroner in any manner inconsistent with the constitution or state law) and 25 (courts and
their officers may be established only as provided in the judiciary article).
35. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 402 So. 2d 669 (La. 1981),
analyzed in Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Local Government Law,
43 La. L. Rev. 461, 477-83 (1982) [hereinafter Murchison, 1981-1982 Developments]; see
also La. R.S. 42:1441.1-.4 (Supp. 1988), analyzed in Murchison, Developments in the
Law, 1984-1985-Local Government Law, 46 La. L. Rev. 491, 523-25 (1986).
36. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. State, 426 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1983), analyzed
in Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Local Government Law, 44 La. L.
Rev. 373, 396-98 (1983).
37. 520 So. 2d 393 (La. 1988). Justice Watson dissented. The premise of his brief
dissenting opinion was the proposition that the juvenile court had exclusive authority "to
direct and control matters having to do with juvenile offenders." In his view, the parish
ordinance establishing the juvenile services department infringed on that authority and
violated "the separation powers doctrine of the Louisiana Constitution." Id. at 400.
38. La. Const. art. V, § 18: "Notwithstanding any contrary provision of [the section
providing for jurisdiction of district courts], juvenile . . . courts shall have jurisdiction
as provided by law." See generally Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1924, 37 La. L. Rev. 765, 781-80, 809-14 (1977).
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from enacting laws or ordinances that create or affect courts or their
officers."
The Louisiana legislature established the Juvenile Court for Jefferson
Parish in 1958.0 The current statute specifies the jurisdiction of the
court4t and also requires the parish to "provide suitable quarters for
the court" and to "make necessary provisions for the conduct of the
business of the court" and for its "expenses."
42
The arrangement for providing probation services for the Juvenile
Court for Jefferson Parish has developed over the last three decades.
43
Originally, the juvenile court judge hired the probation officers and paid
them from the court's budget, which the parish funded in accordance
with state law. After the voters of the parish approved a special millage
dedicated "to juvenile court services" in 1971, the judges continued to
hire probation officers and other employees, but paid them from the
millage revenues. Most of these employees were treated as parish em-
ployees covered by the parish civil service system, but the Director of
Court Services was not a civil service employee.
Sometime later, the parish council and the juvenile court judges
became embroiled in a dispute concerning the operation of the juvenile
services program and the use of millage revenues to construct a new
facility for the juvenile court. When the judges removed the Director
of Court Services from her position, the parish council created the
Department of Juvenile Services and hired the former Director to head
it up. The employees of the new department apparently included all of
those persons who had formerly provided probation services under the
supervision of the juvenile court judges, and the parish continued to
use the millage revenues to pay their salaries.
The juvenile court judges then brought suit for a declaratory judg-
ment, challenging the parish's new program for providing probation
services to juveniles. They faulted the new arrangement on three grounds:
(1) it violated the constitutional protection afforded to their court, (2)
it was inconsistent with the state statutes governing juvenile courts, and
(3) it diverted the millage revenues from their dedicated purposes."
Finding merit in the first of these contentions, the trial court ruled in
favor of the judges.
39. La. Const. art. VI, § 25: "Notwithstanding any provision of this Article, courts
and their officers may be established or affected only as provided in Article V of this
constitution."
40. 1958 La. Acts Ex. Sess. No. 10, § 1, adding La. R.S. 13:1596(A).
41. La. R.S. 13:1599 (Supp. 1988).
42. La. R.S. 13:1596(E) (1983).
43. For the supreme court's summary of that development, see Konrad v. Jefferson
Parish Council, 520 So. 2d 393, 395 (La. 1988).
44. 520 So. 2d at 395.
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The decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court on appeal was a
narrow one. The sole question before the court was whether the action
of the parish couhcil conflicted with the constitutional prerogatives of
the juvenile court. 45 The supreme court held that the constitution did
not mandate such exclusive control. Accordingly, the court remanded
the case to the district court to consider the other claims that the judges
had raised.
46
The supreme court's analysis of the issue presented in Konrad was
straightforward. An amendment to the 1921 Constitution authorized
Jefferson Parish to adopt a plan of government that was "subject to
the provisions of the Constitution and laws of this state with respect
to powers and functions of local governments." '47 Under the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 the plan of government remains in effect, and the
parish retains those powers, duties, and functions it enjoyed when the
constitution became effective, "[e]xcept as inconsistent with [the] Con-
stitution. ''48
According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Jefferson Parish
plan of government authorizes the parish council to establish a depart-
ment of juvenile services. 49 As a result, the council's action could not
be assailed unless some state statute or some provision of the constitution
precluded it.So No state statute, however, forecloses local governments
from developing juvenile services programs or from operating juvenile
detention facilities; indeed, the relevant state statute expressly authorized
juvenile courts to use detention facilities other than those operated by
the court." Thus, the judges' claim was reduced to the contention that
45. Id. at 396.
46. Id. at 399, 400.
47. La. Const. of 1921, art. XIV, § 3(c)(2) (amended 1956).
48. La. Const. art. VI, § 4. The provision authorizing the establishment of the
Jefferson Parish charter provided that the plan of government was "subject to the ...
laws of this state with respect to the powers and functions of local governments." La.
Const. of 1921, art. XIV, § 3(c)(2).
49. 520 So. 2d at 396. The court did not identify what provision in the plan of
government conferred this power on the parish council. Although the plan does not include
a specific provision on creating departments, cf. Jefferson Parish Home Rule Charter and
Plan of Government, § 2.01 (A)(5) (providing council authority to consolidate departments),
it does vest the parish with "all the powers... to which it [was] entitled" under the 1921
constitution including "all implied powers necessary and proper for putting them into
effect." Id. § 1.01. Article 2 makes the parish council "the legislative and policymaking
body of the parish" with authority "to exercise all powers of the parish." Id. § 2.01;
see also id. § 2.01(A)(9) (granting parish council authority to "[plerform any other acts,
consistent with law, deemed to be for the best interest of the people of the parish").
50. 520 So. 2d at 398.
51. See La. R.S. 13:1578 (1983):
Provisions shall be made for the temporary detention of children in a
detention home, to be conducted as an agency of the court or other appropriate
[Vol. 49
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
the parish's operation of a department of juvenile services was incon-
sistent with the constitution, in particular, the provisions of Article V,
section 18 that authorize juvenile courts.
The court gave three reasons for rejecting the constitutional argument
advanced by the judges. First, the state constitution grants juvenile courts
and other courts of limited jurisdiction less protection from legislative
interference than it gives courts of general jurisdiction. The legislature
not only has the power to abolish or merge such courts; it also prescribes
the extent of their jurisdiction.5 2 Second, no state law gives exclusive
jurisdiction and authority over juvenile matters to the juvenile courts.
The legislature has not enacted any statutes that grant juvenile courts
exclusive control of probation services, and the supreme court has not
prescribed any administrative rules to that effect. Third, in a footnote,
the court declared that it found "persuasive" but not "conclusive" the
"fact that no other juvenile court ... in the state deems it necessary
to control exclusively any post adjudication services to juveniles.""
The court's resolution of the issue presented in Konrad was com-
mendable. All three reasons cited by the court reflect valid concerns.
Neither the text of the constitution nor any state legislation expressly
supports the judges' claim. A decision in favor of the judges would
have required construing the constitution to mandate a system that other
juvenile courts have found unnecessary or undesirable. Moreover, con-
ferring upon the juvenile courts an exclusive power to provide juvenile
probation services would have unnecessarily restricted the authority of
local governmental subdivisions. If parishes and municipalities are per-
mitted to provide juvenile services in cooperation with their juvenile
courts, they may make important contributions to helping juveniles that
are under the courts' supervision. Unfortunately, the parties in Konrad
have thus far been unable to cooperate. If that inability persists, the
proper authority to resolve the conflict is the legislature.
Given the narrowness of the holding in Konrad, the court's decision
in that case obviously does not bring an end to the litigation between
the judges and the parish. In particular, the supreme court did not
consider whether the parish has improperly diverted dedicated tax re-
venues. The judges allege that the funding for the new department
established by the parish comes from a millage dedicated exclusively to
"juvenile court .services." If that claim is proved at trial, then the
dedicated funds remain under the control of the juvenile court alone.
public agency .... (emphasis added).
This statement seems to leave open the possibility that local governments may operate
such houses.
52. La. Const. art. V, § 18; Konrad, 520 So. 2d at 398.
53. Id. at 399.
19881
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In addition, the court also noted that the juvenile court can provide
post-adjudication services to juveniles even though it cannot forbid the
parish from providing similar services.5 4 If the services provided by the
parish fail to meet the needs of the juveniles under the court's juris-
diction, the court apparently can require that those services be provided
from other sources. The court might then classify the costs incurred in
providing those services as court "expenses" for which the parish must
make provision under state law." So long as those expenses are rea-
sonable, the judges can obtain writs of mandamus ordering their pay-
ment.16
The second of the 1988 cases that involved a dispute between an
elected official and the parish governing authority shows the potential
for resolving these conflicts on the basis of statutes rather than the
constitution. In Reed v. Washington Parish Police Jury,5 7 a district
attorney and the local policy jury disagreed on the appropriate level of
funding for his office. In an argument similar to the one advanced by
the judges in Konrad, the district attorney contended that the local
government's action interfered with the constitutional prerogatives of his
office. The supreme court, however, managed to decide the case without
reaching the constitutional claim. Instead, the court held that the statute
which authorized the parish to contribute to the district attorney's op-
erational expenses required it to fund those expenses to the extent that
they were reasonable.5 9
The dispute in Reed concerned the Washington Parish Police Jury's
1986 appropriation for the expenses of the district attorney for the
Twenty-Second Judicial District. Although the district attorney requested
an appropriation of $145,025.00, the police jury appropriated only
$42,246.12. The district attorney responded by seeking a writ of man-
damus to compel the police jury to provide more adequate funding.60
54. Id.
55. La. R.S. 13:1596(E) (1983).
56. McCain v. Grant Parish Police Jury, 440 So. 2d 1369 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983);
cf. Reed v. Washington Parish Police Jury, 518 So. 2d 1044 (La. 1988) (police jury must
pay reasonable expenses of district attorney).
57. 518 So. 2d 1044 (La. 1988). Justice Dennis submitted a brief concurring opinion,
see infra note 66, and Justice Dixon dissented without opinion.
58. Id. at 1045.
59. Id. at 1049.
60. 518 So. 2d at 1045. The police jury actually paid $45,070.87, slightly more than
was originally appropriated. The district attorney covered the bulk of the remainder of
his expenses from the criminal court fund. In addition, he also received $14,550.68 from
the the special fund established pursuant to Revised Statutes 16:16 and $4,091.24 from
the worthless check fund.
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The district court's judgment granting the writ was reversed on appeal
by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal.61 The supreme court
then granted certiorari. 62
The task facing the supreme court was to construe that part of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6 under which local governing bodies are
"authorized to pay from their general funds" certain designated expenses
of the district attorney. According to the court, "[t]he word 'authorized'
is susceptible to two interpretations, one mandatory and one permissive":
it could be a "direction to the police jury to act," or it could merely
"empower[] the police jury to act." '63 Ultimately, the court concluded
that the statute imposes a mandatory rather than a permissive duty. To
support that conclusion, the court relied on the language of the statute,
the history of the statute's evolution into its present form, and the
statute's relation to the other methods of funding for the expenses of
the district attorney's office.
The Reed court began its analysis by examining the language of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6. The first paragraph of that section
provides that the district attorney "shall" be entitled to two expense
allowances, one for the salaries of his office employees and the other
for mailing, telephone, transportation, and related expenses. The second
paragraph provides a means for paying the allowances by authorizing
the parish governing authority to pay the expenses listed in the first
paragraph. Construing the paragraphs together, the court reasoned that
the duty imposed by the second has to be mandatory. According to the
court, finding that the duty of the second paragraph is permissive would
negate the mandatory language of the first 64 because "[i]t would make
little sense for the legislature to create a mandatory expense allowance
and then tell the providers of the fund they were free to fund that
expense allowance or not." '65 Although "authorized" might seem a cu-
rious word to use to impose a mandatory duty, the court discerned an
obvious reason that the legislature would choose such a term for a
funding statute like section 6. The choice of that term was "nothing
more than a legislative recognition of the principle that a police jury
is a creature of the state and possesses only those powers conferred by
the state's constitution and statutes." Without the legislative authori-
zation, the police jury would have been "powerless to act." '66
61. Reed v. Washington Parish Police Jury, 515 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
62. 518 So. 2d at 1049.
63. Id. at 1045.
64. Id. at 1046.
65. Id. at 1046.
66. Id. Justice Dennis' concurring opinion noted that the 1974 constitution abrogated
the concept of "creature's of the state" for local governments with home rule charters.
Id. at 1049.
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After examining the language of the statute, the court reviewed the
statute's historical development in some detail. As originally enacted in
1938, the section established a $1200 expense account funded by the
state. 67 A 1959 amendment increased the state reimbursement to $5000
and added a second paragraph that authorized police juries to pay for
expenses that exceeded this amount. 6 The statute assumed its present
form following its amendment in 1973. That amendment deleted the
provision for state funding from the first paragraph and eliminated from
the second paragraph the $5000 threshold for police jury funding. 69 In
the court's view, "throughout the history of [this section] the Legislature
envisioned [that] the Legislative branch of either state or local govern-
ment would bear the primary responsibility for funding the expenses." '70
Thus, the court concluded, when "the state abandoned its role in funding
[the] expenses" in 1973, the legislature must have "intended to place
the entire burden for funding the 16:6 expenses on the police jury."' T
Finally, the court considered the various alternate funding sources
that the legislature has provided for district attorneys and the significance
that these sources have for the proper interpretation of section 6. Three
statutes other than section 6 provide funds that the district attorney
may use to defray the expenses of the office. Louisiana Revised Statutes
15:571.11 creates a criminal court fund that is used in part to pay
certain expenses of the district attorney's office, 72 Louisiana Revised
Statutes 16:15 7 allows the district attorney to collect a worthless check
fee for each worthless check that he processes, and Louisiana Revised
Statues 16:1674 imposes a special ten dollar charge on every criminal
defendant who is convicted, pleads guilty, or forfeits a bond.
The court began its consideration of the significance of these funding
sources by rejecting the suggestion of the court of appeal that the criminal
court fund, rather than the allocation made by the local government,
was intended to be "the primary source of revenues" for funding the
operations of the district attorney's office. The district attorney, the
court observed, needs a "reliable source of funding to ensure the effective
operation of the office." The criminal court fund, however, does not
satisfy that criterion. It fluctuates in amount and its size is affected
"by a number of factors." Further, the court noted, the assets in the
criminal court fund are not available to the district attorney without
67. 1938 La. Acts No. 20, §§ 1, 2.
68. 1959 La. Acts No. 113, § 17.
69. 1973 La. Acts No. 115, § 1.
70. 518 So. 2d at 1047.
71. Id.
72. La. R.S. 15:571.11(A)(l)(a) (Supp. 1988).
73. La. R.S. 16:15 (Supp. 1988).
74. La. R.S. 16:16 (Supp. 1988).
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court approval. 5 Thus, the court found that the legislature could not
have intended for the district attorney to rely on the criminal court
fund as its chief source of revenues.
Instead of supplanting the mandatory duty of the police jury, the
supreme court reasoned, the various alternative funding sources simply
provide supplementary sources of revenue to meet "the increased cost
of operating the district attorney's office." These funding sources, the
court found, were inadequate "to ensure that the basic function of the
district attorney will not be impaired." Although the availability of
alternate funds "suggest[ed] a need for cooperative intergovernmental
relations," the court suggested that the proper forums for resolving
problems arising from lack of cooperation between district attorneys and
local governments are "the legislature" and "the political arena. ''76
The Reed court's desire to provide district attorneys with a reliable
source of funding was understandable, and its plea for cooperation
between local governments and district attorneys was laudable. Unfor-
tunately its decision gave the district attorney more protection than was
required, and it is also likely to discourage rather than encourage the
intended cooperation. These results of the decision seem particularly
undesirable at present because many parish governing authorities in
Louisiana are currently facing dire financial situations.
Reed's most obvious defect is its overprotection of district attorneys.
By imposing an absolute obligation on the police jury to fund the
reasonable expenses of the district attorney, Reed allows the district
attorney to hoard other sources of funding.77 The district attorneys can
then use those funds to support nonessential activities that could be
eliminated without impairing "the basic function of the district attor-
ney." The record in Reed reveals that the alternative funds available
to the district attorney may be quite substantial.' Thus, a preferable
construction of the statute would obligate the parish to fund the district
attorney's office only to the extent that the moneys available from the
alternate sources are insufficient to defray the district attorney's rea-
sonable expenses.
From a practical standpoint, the Reed decision is unlikely to promote
cooperation. It will effectively force police juries to exempt district
attorneys from the expenditure reductions that most parishes are now
75. 518 So. 2d at 1048.
76. Id. at 1048-49.
77. See, e.g., Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, October 18, 1988, § B, at 1, col. 1
(even though Tangipahoa Parish Council faces a budget shortfall of 40 percent, district
attorney demands a substantial increase in appropriation on the ground that all of his
reasonable expenses have to be funded regardless of the impact on other services provided
by the parish).
78. See supra note 60.
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making. If funding for the district attorney is exempted from these cuts,
then funding for other parish services will probably have to be decreased.
Furthermore, under the rule of Reed, the parish governing authority,
and not the district attorney, will have to appeal to the voters to support
increased taxes should additional revenues be needed to fund increases
in the expenses of running the district attorney's office. Such devel-
opments can only generate still more dissension between local govern-
ments and district attorneys.
Furthermore, the danger to parish governments posed by the likely
effects of Reed is not a fanciful one. The state is transferring the cost
of many functions and services to the local level, and many parishes
have limited resources to pay those costs. Some have even contemplated
bankruptcy. Given the existence of this financial emergency, it is par-
ticularly unfortunate that the court construed Louisiana Revised Statutes
16:6 in a manner designed to exempt district attorneys from the con-
sequences of this financial emergency.
Of course, the court's decision need not be the final word. Since
the court based its holding on the statute rather the constitutional status
of the district attorney, legislative revision is possible. The legislature
should amend Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6 to require cooperation.
It should require the district attorney to pay the reasonable expenses of
the office from the dedicated sources of revenue to the extent that they
are available. If those funds are insufficient to provide for the reasonable
expenses of the office, then the police jury should be required to fund
the remainder. Such a statutory revision would both provide for the
legitimate needs of the district attorneys and minimize the financial
burden on parishes.
LAND USE REGULATION
In Louisiana, as elsewhere, nonconforming land uses present difficult
policy choices for land use regulators. On the one hand, nonconforming
uses are, by definition, inconsistent with the comprehensive plan, and
allowing them to continue undermines the plan. 79 On the other hand,
basic considerations of equity and fairness, as well as federal s° and state8l
prohibitions against taking private property without paying just com-
pensation, counsel that local governments should permit landowners to
79. See Fuller v. City of New Orleans, 311 So. 2d 466, 468 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975).
80. U.S. Const. amend. V. For an analysis of recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court defining what constitutes a taking under federal law, see Murchison, 1986-
1987 Developments, supra note 17, at 308-22.
81. La. Const. art. 1, § 4; see generally, Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1, 10-20 (1974).
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continue uses that antedate the restrictions established in the zoning
ordinances.
As originally enacted in 1926,2 Louisiana's Zoning Enabling Act
did not require that municipal zoning ordinances contain exceptions for
nonconforming uses. A 1929 decision of the state supreme court con-
firmed the constitutionality of requiring commercial establishments lo-
cated in newly created residential districts to close within one year after
the effective date of a new zoning ordinance. 3 But early decisions also
upheld the practice of exempting nonconforming uses from zoning re-
gulations, 4 and a 1948 amendment to the enabling act required such
an exemption for premises "which have been continuously used for
commercial purposes since January 1, 1929, without interruption for
more than six consecutive months at any one time.''85
Although the 1948 amendment to the Zoning Enabling Act does not
expressly require exemptions for nonconforming uses begun after January
1, 1929, the typical local zoning ordinance includes exemptions for all
nonconforming uses in existence on the ordinance's effective date. 6 Like
the Act, many local ordinances also provide for the termination of the
exemption if the property is subjected to some use other than its non-
conforming use for a period of six months . 7
Two recent Louisiana decisions clarify exactly when local govern-
ments may terminate nonconforming uses for nonuse. Both concerned
the proper construction of the six-month nonuse provision in the New
82. 1926 La. Acts No. 240 (codified with amendments at La. R.S. 33:4721-31 (1988)).
An earlier statute had given cities with populations over 50,000 authority to control
business uses. 1918 La. Acts No. 27 (codified at La. R.S. 33:4731-32 (1988)).
The Louisiana statute was part of a national trend. In 1926, the United States Supreme
Court upheld a comprehensive municipal zoning ordinance against federal constitutional
challenges in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926).
For early Louisiana analyses of the power to zone, see Fordham, Legal Aspects of Zoning
and Local Planning in Louisiana, 6 La. L. Rev. 495 (1946); Burns, Police Power in
Zoning, 7 Loyola L.J. 16 (1926).
83. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert.
denied, 280 U.S. 556, 50 S. Ct. 16 (1929).
84. Sampere v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 776, 117 So. 827 (1928), aff'd, 279
U.S. 812, 49 S. Ct. 262 (1928); State ex rel. Manhein v. Harrison, 164 La. 564, 114 So.
159 (1927).
85. 1948 La. Acts No. 471, § 1 (codified at La. R.S. 33:4722(C) (1988)).
86. See, e.g. City of New Orleans, Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance art. 12, § 1;
City of Alexandria, Comprehensive Zoning Law, art. V, § 1; City of Kenner, Zoning
Ordinances § 19.01; City of Baton Rouge - Parish of East Baton Rouge, Code of
Ordinances § 7:302.
87. See, e.g., City of New Orleans, Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance art. 12, § 2;
City of Kenner, Zoning Ordinance § 19.03; cf. City of Alexandria, Comprehensive Zoning
Law art. V, § 55(5) (6 consecutive months or 18 months during any three-year period);
but see City of Baton Rouge-Parish of East Baton Rouge, Code of Ordinances § 7:304
(requiring 12-month vacancy to terminate a commercial use in a residential area).
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Orleans zoning ordinance, and both involved rental property that the
owners had failed to lease during the six-month period. In one, the
Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the property's use as a multi-family
dwelling did not come to an end when two of the four units were
vacant for more than six months.88 In the other, the fourth circuit held
that a six-month vacancy in all seven of the units in an apartment
building terminated the property's nonconforming use exemption even
though the vacancies resulted from a depressed rental market.8 9
Like the state enabling act, the New Orleans zoning ordinance es-
tablishes a six-month period for terminating nonconforming uses on
account of nonuse, but the ordinance is considerably more specific than
the statute. It expressly applies to the nonconforming use of a "building
or portion thereof or land," and it terminates the nonconforming use
exemption whenever the building or land "becomes and remains vacant
for a continuous period of 6 calendar months." The ordinance also
amplifies the vacancy requirement by declaring that neither "the intention
of the owner nor that of anybody else" nor any "makeshift or pretended
nonconforming use" is to be "taken into consideration in interpreting
... the word 'vacant'." Finally, the ordinance qualifies the general
termination-for-nonuse rule in three respects. First, it states that a lessee's
failure to occupy or to use the premises in accordance with the non-
conforming use does not create a vacancy until the owner reassumes
legal control of the property's occupancy and use. Second, it offers an
exemption from the vacancy requirement for property involved in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Third, it establishes a similar exemption for property
involved in foreclosure proceedings. 9°
Lozes v. Waterson9' was the first of the two nonconforming use
decisions. Lozes involved a fourplex apartment building that was situated
in an area zoned for two-family dwellings. Two of the apartments
remained vacant for more than eight months while the owner refurbished
them and sought new, tenants. The plaintiffs92 contended that these
88. Lozes v. Waterson, 513 So. 2d 1155 (La. 1987).
89. Jones v. Cusimano, 524 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 525 So.
2d 1057 (1988).
90. City of New Orleans, Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance art. 12, § 2 (reprinted
in Jones v. Cusimano, 524 So. 2d 172, 173 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 525 So.
2d 1057 (1988)).
91. 513 So. 2d 1155 (La. 1987). Justice Marcus, who dissented, accepted the plaintiffs'
characterization of the property as "being used in part for conforming purposes (two
units) and in part for nonconforming purposes (two units)." When two units remained
unrented, "the part used for nonconforming purposes" was "vacant." Because the vacancy
continued for more than six months, the nonconforming use was terminated and the
property was subject to the restrictions of the zoning ordinance. Id. at 1158.
92. The plaintiffs were individuals who owned residential dwellings within the vicinity
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vacancies terminated the nonconforming use exemption. By renting only
two apartments, they argued, the owners had used the building as a
two-family dwelling in accordance with its zoning classification. They
further contended that the two unrented apartments constituted a non-
conforming "portion" of the building. Because that "portion" of the
building remained vacant for more than six months, it lost its noncon-
forming use status.
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the vacancy argument because
it rejected the premise upon which it was based. The court refused to
treat the fourplex as a structure that consisted of two "portions"-two
apartments subject to a conforming use and two apartments subject to
a nonconforming use. According to the court, the entire apartment
building, not just a portion thereof, constituted the nonconforming use.
Consequently, that part of the ordinance that provided for the loss of
nonconforming uses of "portions" of buildings was simply inapplicable.
In short, the building had to be treated as a single entity subject to
one use.
Having treated the building as a single entity, the court had no
difficulty concluding that the nonuse rule did not apply. Because the
lessor had rented two of the apartments at all times, the building was
never "vacant" so as to trigger the running of the six-month period.93
The court gave three reasons for this construction of the ordinance.
First, the court noted that a contrary ruling might have deleterious
effects on the rental market for residences. Construing the ordinance
in the manner urged by the plaintiffs would "have the effect of dis-
couraging a property owner from refurbishing apartments in a multi-
apartment building ... since he would risk the possibility of losing the
use of part of his property if the renovations could not be completed
and the apartment relet within a six month period." ' 94 Second, the court
invoked the rule that zoning regulations must be interpreted in favor
of the property owner whenever they are subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation. 95 Third, the court noted that its construction
of the ordinance followed the administrative construction that had been
given to it by the city attorney. 96
The fourth circuit's decision in Jones v. Cusimano,97 the second of
the nonconforming use decisions, makes clear that Lozes does not pre-
of the fourplex. Id. at 1156. The courts have long implied a private right of action even
though the statutory enforcement section, Revised Statutes 33:4728 (1988), only mentions
public enforcement actions. See City of New Orleans v. Leeco, 219 La. 550, 53 So. 2d
490 (1951); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929).
93. Lozes, 513 So. 2d at 1158.
94. Id. at 1157.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1158.
97. 524 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 525 So. 2d 1057 (1988).
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clude termination of a nonconforming use when the property is vacant
because of a depressed rental market. The property involved in Jones
was a seven-apartment building. Like the property in question in Lozes,
it was located in an area of New Orleans zoned for two-family dwellings.
After all seven apartments remained vacant for slightly more than six
months, the plaintiffs98 sought an injunction prohibiting the defendant-
lessor from using the property in violation of the zoning ordinance. The
district court granted the petition.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the six-month vacancy did
not terminate the nonconforming use because the "vacancy was not
voluntary, but was caused by an inability to secure tenants." 99 The
fourth circuit disagreed. It concluded that the ordinance's vacancy rule
applies whether the vacancy is voluntary or involuntary. According to
the court, "[tihat the lack of tenants may have been beyond defendant's
control [was] not legally material.' ' °
The court of appeal acknowledged that two prior Louisiana appellate
court decisions contain language supporting the defendant's claim, but
it found both decisions distinguishable. In Fuller v. City of New Or-
leans,'01 the court included the voluntariness requirement in an expla-
nation of the "general law of zoning."'' 2 However, Fuller's actual
holding undercut the proposition that vacancies must be voluntary. In
Fuller, the court applied the vacancy rule of the New Orleans ordinance
to terminate the nonconforming use status of a barroom that the owner,
because of illness, had not used for more than six months. The case
contains "no suggestion that the owner 'voluntarily' became ill and
discontinued the nonconforming use of the property." 1° In Kinard v.
Carrier,°4 the other case on which the defendant relied, the court held
that a vacancy resulting from the owner's inability to secure tenants did
not amount to a discontinuation of use sufficient to terminate the
property's nonconforming use status. Kinard, however, concerned the
Lake Charles zoning ordinance, which "contained no specific provision"
describing when a nonconforming use could be terminated for nonuse.
Consequently, that decision was not controlling with respect to the New
Orleans ordinance, which includes an express declaration that a six-
month vacancy terminates a nonconforming use. 05
98. As in Lozes, the plaintiffs in Jones were other landowners in the neighborhood.
See Petition for Preliminary Injunction, Jones v. Cusimano, La. App. 4th Cir. No. CA-
8394.
99. 524 So. 2d at 173.
100. Id. at 174-75.
101. 311 So. 2d 466 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
102. Id. at 468.
103. 524 So. 2d at 174.
104. 175 So. 2d 920 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
105. 524 So. 2d at 174.
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The Jones court also rejected the defendant's suggestion that those
provisions of the ordinance which establish exemptions for certain spec-
ified involuntary vacancies like bankruptcy create a general involuntar-
iness exception to the usual vacancy rule. 06 According to the court,
those specific exemptions simply do not create such a general exception,
especially since the ordinance itself "does not classify any use or non-
use as 'voluntary' or 'involuntary'."' 17
Taken together, Lozes and Jones stand for two propositions. First,
they reaffirm the longstanding Louisiana rule that the termination of a
nonconforming use on account of nonuse is permissible regardless of
the reason for the user's failure to continue the nonconforming use.
Second, they confirm the rule that zoning provisions governing the
termination of nonconforming uses must be strictly construed, a rule
that serves to mitigate the harshness of the nonuse rule. Thus, if a local
government plans to extinguish a nonconforming use for nonuse, it must
advise the property owner in clear and unequivocal terms.
This combination of termination authority and strict construction
of termination provisions strikes a reasonable balance between the com-
peting policies of* treating property owners fairly and promoting the
consistency of the comprehensive plan. The basic argument for allowing
nonconforming uses to continue is that land use planning should not
defeat the "reasonable investment-backed expectations" of the owner. 108
By demonstrating that the nonconforming use of the property has limited
economic potential, a lengthy vacancy, regardless of the reason behind
it, significantly diminishes the reasonableness of the owner's investment-
backed expectations regarding the use. Terminating the nonconforming
use status of such vacant property, an action that will promote com-
prehensive planning, can therefore be accomplished without fear of
treating the owner unfairly. At the same time, a rule of strict construction
insures that property owners will know precisely when the local gov-
ernment may terminate nonconforming uses and allows them to take
appropriate steps to protect their investment-backed expectations.
The message for local governments with zoning authority is obvious.
Louisiana law allows them to limit the adverse impact that noncon-
forming uses have on comprehensive land use planning. To take ad-
106. For a description of the provisos in the New Orleans ordinance, see supra text
accompanying note 90.
107. 524 So. 2d at 174.
108. The United States Supreme Court has increasingly used the "reasonable investment-
backed expectations" standard to define the limits of the fifth amendment's ban on taking
private property without paying just compensation. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1242 (1987); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1005, 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2874 (1984); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S 74, 83, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2042 (1980).
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vantage of that authority, however, they must enact zoning ordinances
that expressly describe when and under what circumstances discontin-
uance of a nonconforming use will terminate the property's noncon-
forming use status. Prudent local governments should review their zoning
ordinances now, so that they, rather than the courts, can strike the
balance between the competing policies of land use planning.
REVENUE POWERS
Like many large cities in the United States, New Orleans has ex-
perienced serious financial difficulties in recent years. Having exhausted
traditional revenue sources, the city has adopted several innovative taxing
measures over the last decade. After sustaining two of those measures
in prior decisions, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected a third in 1987.
City of New Orleans v. Scramuzza'0 9 held that an "earnings tax" imposed
on all income earned in the city violated the Louisiana Constitution.
The taxing authority of New Orleans is apparently unique among
Louisiana municipalities. Under the 1974 Constitution, municipalities and
parishes can levy only those taxes that are specifically authorized by
the Constitution or by the state legislature) 0 However, the New Orleans
home rule charter, which was "continue[d] in effect" by the 1974
Constitution,"' gives the city broad taxing authority. Specifically, it
allows the city to impose any taxes that are "not expressly prohibited"
by the state constitution. ' 12
The Louisiana Constitution contains several express limits on local
taxing powers. For example, it forbids any parish or municipality from
collecting a "license fee on motor vehicles""' 3 or from levying an "in-
cometax. ' '" 4 In addition, the Constitution limits the ad valorem taxes
that local governments can collect on immovable property." 5
In two decisions handed down around the turn of this decade, both
of which were styled ACORN v. City of New Orleans,"6 the Louisiana
109. 507 So. 2d 215 (La. 1987). The author was one of several persons who testified
as expert witnesses on behalf of the city in Scramuzza. See id. at 216-17. By invalidating
the tax, the Louisiana Supreme Court elected not to rely on that testimony. Obviously,
the reader should be aware of this potential source of bias in evaluating the following
criticism of the Scramuzza opinion and decision.
110. La. Const. art. VI, § 30.
111. Id. § 4.
112. 1936 La. Acts No. 388, § 1.
113. La. Const. art. VII, § 5.
114. Id. art. VII, § 4(C).
115. See La. Const. art. VI, §§ 26, 27; art. VII, §§ 18, 20, 21.
116. Acorn v. City of New Orleans (Acorn 1), 377 So. 2d 1206 (La. 1979), analyzed
in Murchison, 1979-1980 Developments, supra note 3, at 493-99; Acorn v. City of New
Orleans (Acorn 1), 407 So. 2d 1225 (La. 1981), analyzed in Murchison, 1981-1982
Developments, supra note 35, at 474-76.
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Supreme Court narrowly construed the ban on vehicles license fees and
the limits on ad valorem taxes. ACORN I upheld a $100 service charge
that New Orleans levied on every parcel of land listed on the city's tax
rolls." 7 According to the supreme court, the enactment did not conflict
with the constitution's limitations on the power of local governments
to impose property taxes. Those limitations apply only to ad valorem
taxes. The New Orleans levy was a specific tax, unrelated to the values
of individual parcels. ACORN II employed an analogous analytical
approach to validate a New Orleans ordinance that levied a "road use
charge" on all automobiles registered in the parish or owned by persons
residing in or businesses located in the parish. Finding that the city
adopted the tax for the purpose of providing revenue" 1 8 rather than
for a "regulatory" purpose," 9 the court ruled that the levy was a tax,
not a license fee. Because the constitutional provision only forbade local
license fees, the levy in question fell outside the scope of the prohibition.
Several years after the supreme court decided the ACORN cases,
the city of New Orleans began to experience acute revenue shortfalls.
City officials thereupon took up the task of devising a new taxing
scheme, one that they hoped would pass constitutional muster under
the ACORN principles. The new tax, called an "earnings tax," applied
to everyone working in the city; the amount of the tax was fixed at
"1.5076 of annual gross earnings, in excess of-$5,000.120
When the new tax was challenged, the city defended it by urging
a strict construction of the constitutional ban on local income taxes.
This prohibition, the city contended, only forbids taxes similar to the
federal and state income taxes, that is, taxes that (1) include all income
and not just earnings, (2) are levied on net income, (3) and incorporate
a comprehensive set of deductions and exemptions. Applying this stan-
dard, the city contended that its tax clearly fell outside the perimeter
of the constitutional ban. This tax was "levied only on one source of
income" and was "measured by a percentage of gross earnings, rather
than net income."' 2'
In Scramuzza, the Louisiana Supreme Court unanimously rejected
the city's argument. At the outset of the opinion the court identified
principles of interpretation that would guide its resolution of the con-
stitutional questions raised by the case. First, the court stated that one
must give to constitutional language the meaning that "would have been
given to those words or terms by the people when they adopted the
117. 377 So. 2d at 1208.
118. 407 So. 2d at 1228.
119. Id.
120. Scramuzza, 507 So. 2d at 216.
121. Id. at 217.
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Constitution."'12 2 Second, the court insisted that one may not consult
the history of a constitutional provision in the search for interpretive
guidance when "constitutional intent is evident" from the text and
"explicit language" is used. 23 Applying these interpretive maxims to the
problem before it, the court concluded that the earnings tax ran afoul
of the constitution's ban on local income taxes.
Citing definitions of the term "income tax" found in legal diction-
aries and federal and state statutes, the Scramuzza court conceded that
"ascertain[ing] a precise definition of an income tax would prove to be
a near impossible task" because the definition would "necessarily vary
to conform to the various systems of income taxation." The court
concluded, however, that it did not need to arrive at such a definition
in order to resolve the issue. For that purpose the court had only to
determine "if the Earnings Tax should be classified as a prohibited
form of 'income tax' under our constitution."' 24
The evidence in the record convinced the court that the New Orleans
levy was such a prohibited tax. When the term "income tax" is inter-
preted in a "natural and popular" rather than a technical sense, the
court stated, it encompasses the New Orleans earnings tax. Because the
income of the "vast majority of the people in this state consists only
of wages, salaries, and commissions," those people, when they voted
to adopt the constitution, must have understood that the income tax
prohibition covers taxes like the earnings tax. Interpreted in this manner,
the court insisted, the term was not "doubtful." Consequently, recourse
to nontextual arguments like the history of the constitutional prohibition
was inappropriate. 12-
The court's analysis in Scramuzza is unpersuasive. In other decisions
of recent years, the court has not relied on either of the wooden maxims
that it employed in invalidating the New Orleans earnings tax. The
preference for "a natural and popular" interpretation conflicts not only
with the technical approaches taken in ACORN I and ACORN II,126
but also with another recent opinion in which the court declared that
the constitution's "debt" limitations do not apply to revenue anticipation
122. Id. (citing Chehardy v. Democratic Executive Comm., 249 So. 2d 196 (La. 1971)).
123. 507 So. 2d at 218 (citing Barnett v. Develle, 289 So. 2d 129 (La. 1974)).
124. Id.
125. Id. The court described "the fiscal needs of the city" as "irrelevant" to "the
legal principles which mandate our decision." Id. at 219.
126. See Murchison, 1981-1982 Developments, supra note 35, at 498 (praising the
court's acceptance of the distinction between ad valorem and specific taxes); Murchison,
1979-1981 Developments, supra note 3, at 476 (commending the court's acceptance of the
longstanding distinction between license fees and taxes).
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notes.127 Similarly, the court's insistence that the plain meaning of the
constitutional text precluded it from considering nontextual arguments
provides a jarring contrast to the court's willingness, during the same
term, to use nontextual arguments in demonstrating that the word "au-
thorized" is mandatory rather than permissive. 2 The court's decision
also ignores decisions from other jurisdictions, rendered before the adop-
tion of the constitution in 1974, in which various courts construed similar
language in their own constitutions. In many of those decisions the
courts allowed local governments to enact taxes calculated on the basis
of worker earnings.129
Nor do the analytical weaknesses of Scramuzza lack practical sig-
nificance. Many municipalities and other local governments face severe
revenue shortfalls, and local revenue needs are likely to increase even
further if the present governor succeeds in transferring to local govern-
ments a greater share of the responsibility for providing services. One
can, therefore, reasonably expect that local governments will try to use
all of the tax alternatives that are available to them in order to increase
revenue and that, following the lead of New Orleans, other local gov-
ernments are likely to begin assessing some charges against "free ri-
ders'"-nonresidents who make demands on services, but escape the
application of traditional taxes. Scramuzza provides little basis for pre-
dicting which tax efforts will prove successful.
The analytical shortcomings of the Scramuzza decision are even more
regrettable because they were unnecessary. At least two analytically sound
arguments could have supported the court's ruling. In the first place,
one could have relied on the record of the constitutional convention.
Delegates from the suburban New Orleans parishes, who were strong
supporters of the ban on local income taxes, expressed concern that
New Orleans might impose an income tax on suburban nonresidents.
As a practical matter, the only nonresident "income" that New Orleans
could possibly tax was then and still is income earned within the city.
Because that earned income was the very item taxed by the New Orleans
earnings tax, one could argue that the opponents to local income taxes
127. State Bond Comm'n v. All Taxpayers, 510 So.2d 662, 665 (La. 1987) ("[W]e
are persuaded that, as used, the word ['debt'] is a term of art or technical term to be
interpreted according to its received meaning and 'acceptation with those learned in the
field of governmental finance.").
128. Reed v. Washington Parish Policy Jury, 518 So. 2d 1044 (La. 1988), analyzed
at supra text accompanying notes 57-78.
129. See, e.g., City of Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W.2d 248 (1948); cf.
Weekes v. City of Oakland, 579 P.2d 449 (Cal. 1978) (post-1974 decision construing the
California Constitution).
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must have intended to include the earnings tax within the ban.'30 The
second possible argument, which may be classified as "structural," rests
upon the absence of political restraints upon the city's ability to tax
nonresidents. Allowing the city to transfer a significant portion of its
tax burden to nonresidents would subject those persons to taxes for
which they have no effective redress in the political process. Moreover,
the voters of the city are unlikely to provide a satisfactory surrogate
for protecting the interests of such nonresidents. Because requiring non-
residents to pay city taxes would mean better services and lower taxes
for city residents, rational voters in the city would be more likely to
accept the earnings tax than tax measures that do not export the cost
of government to suburban commuters. Unfortunately, the Scramuzza
court cited neither of these arguments in support of its decision.
The difficulties with the Scramuzza court's analysis do not end with
the court's failure to develop available historical and structural argu-
ments. That analysis may be faulted on two additional grounds. First,
the court neglected to justify its analytical approach. Absent from the
opinion is any explanation of why the court abandoned the deferential,
policy oriented approach of earlier tax cases. This omission gives the
impression of judicial decision-making by assertion rather than by anal-
ysis. Second, the opinion does not aid in the prediction of future legal
outcomes. On the contrary, it creates uncertainty regarding whether, in
future cases, the court will rely on "plain meaning" and the "popular
interpretation" technique or a policy-oriented approach coupled with an
emphasis on the "technical" meaning of legal phrases. In future litigation
regarding local taxes, the court will have two lines of decision available
to it, and litigants will have no means of divining in advance which
line the court will choose to follow.
The most regrettable aspect of Scramuzza, however, is not its anal-
ysis, but its result. As noted earlier, the text of the constitution did
not dictate the result: The term "income tax" was ambiguous;' a' previous
decisions had narrowly construed constitutional limits on the taxing
powers of the city of New Orleans;' and past decisions had also accepted
technical definitions of constitutional terms like "income tax" that had
130. See 9 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973, at 2853-54
(1973) (statement of Mr. Alario of Westwego opposing an amendment to permit local
governments to adopt income taxes because it would allow the voters of one parish to
"tax residents of another parish who work in that particular area" and describing the
local income tax as an "earnings" tax).
131. See Scramuzza, 507 So. 2d at 218 ("To ascertain a precise definition of an
income tax would prove to be a near impossible task.").
132. Acorn v. City of New Orleans (Acorn 1), 377 So. 2d 1206 (La 1979); Acorn v.
City of New Orleans (Acorn II), 407 So. 2d 1225 (La. 1981).
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been restrictively defined in other jurisdictions.' When the constitutional
text does not compel the result, the ultimate test of the decision is how
well it promotes sound policy, and the Scramuzza decision, unfortu-
nately, does not advance the longterm interests of the state. Because
the geographic boundaries of New Orleans encompass only a portion
of the metropolitan area, 3 4 the city's tax basis has steadily eroded as
individuals and businesses have relocated in the suburbs. The resulting
pattern is a typical one for American cities: The reduced tax base
produces both higher taxes and reduced services, and the rise in taxes
and decline in services in turn accelerate migration to the suburbs. By
denying the city the opportunity to tax nonresidents who are significant
users of municipal services, the court has increased the likelihood that
the decline of New Orleans will continue. That decline is regrettable.
In the long run, it adversely affects not only the city but also the larger
metropolitan area and the state as a whole.
133. See supra note 127.
134. Legal, as well as practical, restrictions preclude the city of New Orleans from
annexing territory in adjacent parishes. See La. R.S. 33:172(A) (Supp. 1987).
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